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ALLOCATION OF INVENTIVE EFFORT IN COMPLEX
PRODUCT SYSTEMS
SENDIL K. ETHIRAJ*
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
U.S.A.
This paper examines the allocation of inventive effort in complex product systems. I argue
that complex product systems, e.g., personal computers (PCs), are distinguished by functional
interaction among several components, each guided by a relatively autonomous bundle of
technical and economic characteristics. I try to explore whether the dynamics of such interactions
between components of complex product systems can help us understand changes in the relative
allocation of inventive effort. I advance and empirically test three hypotheses: (1) emergence of
component constraints (bottlenecks) in product systems will trigger research and development
(R&D) investment to resolve the constraints; (2) slack component firms have a strong incentive
to invest in resolving component constraints; and (3) the incentive of slack component firms to
invest in resolving component constraints is increasing in their prior sunk R&D investments in
slack components. In sum, I argue that interactions between components in a product system
conditions the R&D incentives of firms and also that the incentives are increasing in their prior
investments or capabilities. Using product reviews from technical journals, I trace the constraint
components in the PC from 1981 to 1998 and attempt to predict shifts in the allocation of inventive
effort in the subsequent period. The empirical results strongly support all three hypotheses. This
study highlights the paradoxical effect of modularity in complex product systems. Modular design
architectures, while contributing to accelerating the pace of technical change, also tend to limit
the economic benefits of firms’ component R&D efforts, especially when different components
technologies are progressing at different rates. This often creates an impetus to enlarge the
scope of firm R&D activities beyond the component product markets that firms operate in. Other
implications for R&D decision making are discussed. Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of designing and coordinating the
activities of large-scale complex systems, such as
products or organizations, is central to the man-
agement research enterprise. Simon (1962), in his
seminal essay on the Architecture of Complexity,
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suggested that systems that are hierarchical and
nearly decomposable (i.e., modular) help mitigate
the effects of complexity. More recent work advo-
cating the use of modular design principles in com-
plex products (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and orga-
nizations (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) has resur-
rected interest in modularity as a vehicle to manage
complexity. In the product design context, modu-
lar design structures are favored over their inte-
grated counterparts when design objectives such
as flexibility and rapid innovation are more impor-
tant than overall product performance (Ulrich and
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Eppinger, 1999). Modularity accelerates product
innovation by allowing increased specialization of
knowledge, parallel and autonomous innovation
opportunities in different modules, and the recom-
bination of modules to create superior system con-
figurations, respectively (Baldwin and Clark, 2000;
Schilling, 2000). Thus, the central implication is
that using modular designs in complex product
systems reduces the scope of research that firms
need to pursue in-house, relying instead on the
market for noncritical, but complementary, com-
ponents (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).
The present paper examines the allocation of
research and development (R&D) effort in mod-
ular, complex product systems. I argue that com-
plex product systems (e.g., personal computers) are
distinguished by interaction among several com-
ponents, each guided by a relatively autonomous
bundle of technical and economic characteristics.
Thus, if the interactions between components are
public and well documented, R&D and innovation
in the components can occur relatively indepen-
dently of one another. There is, however, a blemish
in this picture of how modularity ushers special-
ization in the targets of innovation efforts. Since
product performance depends significantly on how
the components functionally interact, innovation
in one or more components can alter the nature
and magnitude of interaction between components.
Such changes in the interactions between compo-
nents can alter the incentives of firms to special-
ize in their respective components, and even shift
R&D efforts into components that they do not pro-
duce.
The basic intuition that I try to explore is
whether the dynamics of interactions between
components of complex product systems can help
us understand changes in the allocation of inven-
tive effort between them. I build on the idea
that there is an induced component of inventive
effort that is triggered by the emergence of com-
ponent constraints to system performance (Rosen-
berg, 1969). These component constraints alter the
marginal returns to inventive effort in component
technologies, and thus guide inventive effort in
particular directions. This paper offers three main
contributions. First, the paper elaborates how the
dynamics of component-level interactions partially
shape the technological trajectories in complex
product systems and subtly guide firm R&D incen-
tives in particular directions. Second, the paper
highlights a paradoxical effect of modularity in
complex product systems. Modular design archi-
tectures, while contributing to accelerating the
pace of technical change, also tend to limit the eco-
nomic benefits of firms’ component R&D efforts
especially when different component technologies
progress at different rates. This often creates an
impetus to enlarge the scope of firm R&D activities
beyond the component product markets that they
participate in. Thus, contrary to the expectation
that modularity promotes specialization and the
consequent reduction in firm R&D scope, I hypoth-
esize and empirically demonstrate that, under cer-
tain conditions, on average, all firms in the prod-
uct system, regardless of the component(s) they
produce, have an incentive to resolve component
constraints. Lastly, I complement the existing liter-
ature that has empirically documented that firms’
R&D scope is broader than their product scope
(Patel and Pavitt, 1997) and sought explanations
for why this is so (Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt,
2001). Whereas Brusoni et al. (2001) focus on sys-
tems integration ability as the primary motive for
such an expansion in the scope of R&D activity,
I argue and show that R&D scope widening is
a characteristic not limited to systems integrators
(e.g., Dell in personal computers, Hewlett-Packard
and Sun in workstations, Boeing and Embraer in
aircraft) but extends also to component producers
in complex product systems. The primary motive
for the component producers is to release and
exploit the value of cumulative component R&D
investments.
Using data from the personal computer (PC)
product system, I show that constraint compo-
nents—the component(s) that poses the greatest
bottleneck to improving system performance—are
an important predictor of allocation of inventive
effort in the subsequent period. The results indicate
that the identification of a component as a con-
straint to system performance explains a 13 percent
shift in the allocation of total inventive effort to
that component. I also show that the slack com-
ponent (the component that does not pose a bot-
tleneck to system performance) firms, on average,
shift about 8.5 percent of their R&D investment
in an apparent attempt at resolving such compo-
nent constraints. Finally, the incentive of slack
component firms is increasing in their prior sunk
R&D investments. A 1 percent increase in prior
R&D stock in slack components contributes to a
0.8 percent increase in investment to lift compo-
nent constraints.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, I elaborate on the notion of
complex product systems and develop the theory
and hypotheses. This is followed by the description
of the study setting and the research design. I then
present the results and discuss their implications.
THE DYNAMICS OF INVENTION IN
COMPLEX PRODUCT SYSTEMS
Simon (1962: 468) defined a complex system as
‘one made up of a large number of parts that
interact in a nonsimple way . . . [in] such systems
. . . given the properties of the parts and the laws
of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to
infer the properties of the whole.’ The complex-
ity here stems primarily from the often unknown
nature and magnitude of interactions between dif-
ferent parts of the system and the consequent sys-
tem performance implications. For instance, the
nature of interaction between two parts may range
from positive (increasing in one another), negative
(decreasing in one another), or unrelated. Further-
more, the nature of the interaction may alternate
between positive, negative, and unrelated over dif-
ferent magnitudes of the interaction relationship.
As a result, overall system performance can exhibit
highly nonlinear and/or nonmonotonic behavior in
response to changes in one or more parts. A com-
plex product system is, therefore, a special case
of a complex system and may be usefully viewed
as a set of components that together provide util-
ity to customers (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995:
94). In other words, the value of the components
together is greater than the value separately.
Modularity is a general set of design principles
for managing the complexity of such large-scale
product systems. It involves breaking up the sys-
tem into discrete chunks that communicate with
each other through standardized interfaces or rules
and specifications. Baldwin and Clark (2000: 63)
define a module as ‘a unit whose structural ele-
ments are powerfully connected among themselves
and relatively weakly connected to elements in
other units.’ Thus in a complex product system
with a modular architecture, we can conceive of
at least three levels of analysis: the system, the
components, and the firms that design and man-
ufacture the components. Interactions within and
across the three levels are the key loci of change
and innovation. I examine each in turn.
System level
A distinguishing characteristic of complex prod-
uct systems is that product or system performance
is in part a function of how components interact
together as a system (Garud and Kumaraswamy,
1993; Prencipe, 1997). The interaction relation-
ship among the components of the product also
determines the marginal contributions of the vari-
ous components to product performance (Hoetker,
2006; Ulrich, 1995). For instance, a car engine may
be rated at 100 brake horsepower (BHP). How-
ever, the realized BHP may be determined, among
other things, by the interaction of the engine with
the weight of the chassis, ergonomics of the car
body, the fuel injection system, and so on (Clark
and Fujimoto, 1991: Ch. 5). Because of this char-
acteristic of complex product systems, even when
the system is operating at peak performance not
all its components are likely to be operating at
their highest rated capacity as well (Sahal, 1981:
29). While some may be operating at their high-
est rated capacity, others may still have some
slack. This means that changing the parameters
of one component of the product can have fairly
large and unpredictable consequences for product
performance simply because the interaction rela-
tionship among the components of the product
is altered (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004b). At the
extreme, such micro changes to parts of the prod-
uct can result in highly dysfunctional effects on
product performance.
An illustration is useful in making the argument
clearer. For instance, in a PC, the random access
memory (RAM) unit loads data (or input) and
transfers them via the system bus to the micropro-
cessor for processing. The microprocessor passes
the results back to the RAM unit after process-
ing. System performance is the time taken for one
cycle of the task to be completed. We can see that
system performance (cycle time) can be improved
by increasing the speed and/or processing capacity
of the two components or changing the interface
(i.e., system bus) between them. On the one hand,
if one of the components (say RAM) is perform-
ing at peak capacity and the second component is
operating below capacity, system performance can
be improved only by innovating in the former. On
the other hand, if RAM is kept constant and the
microprocessor’s capacity is improved, then PC
performance can actually degrade if the capacity
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and speed of the RAM are significantly less than
the demands of the microprocessor.
Fixing these ideas more formally, consider a
single-product firm (i.e., a firm that competes in
a single-component product market), F , whose
profits (ceteris paribus), , are a function of its
accumulated R&D stock, R, and its annual flows of
R&D, r . Let P denote system product performance
and p component product performance. Thus, we
define firm profits as
(P (R, r)) = β(p(R, r)) − C(r) (1)
Firm profit in Equation 1 is a function of how
R&D stock and flows are deployed to improve sys-
tem performance. β(p(R, r)) is the firm’s return
from doing R&D to improve component perfor-
mance, p, and C(r) is the total cost of R&D flows
in each period. The key idea is that firms only
engage in component R&D and their returns are a
function of how component R&D, r , affects com-
ponent performance, p, and subsequently system
performance, P .
Let ps denote the performance of the slack com-
ponent(s), and pc the performance of the constraint
component(s). Then by definition, improvement in
slack component performance yields no improve-
ment in system performance and sometimes even
degrades performance because the constraint com-
ponent limits the utilization of slack components.
Conversely, improvement in the constraint compo-








Further, as I argued earlier, in a complex system,
system performance is a function of interdepen-
dencies among the components (Ulrich, 1995). In
other words, unconstrained improvement in one or
more components yields no system performance
improvement since the interdependencies among
the components limits the realization of system
performance improvement (see Rosenberg, 1969,
1974, for several examples of imbalanced technical
change). Thus, system performance is a function
of the interaction among the various components
(Shibata, Yano, and Kodama, 2005). If ps and
pc represent the set of all slack and constraint
components, respectively, then changes in system
performance are a function of the changes in the





Combining Equations 2 and 3 above suggests that
system performance, P , changes as the interaction
among components change, and that system per-
formance improves with improvement in constraint
component performance, pc. Earlier, I argued that
improvement in system performance is a function
of component performance improvement. If sys-
tem performance improvement occurs as a function
of constraint component improvement and system
performance improvement drives profits, then it
follows that returns to R&D in constraint com-
ponents must be greater than zero and immediate
returns to R&D in slack components must be zero







where rc is the annual flow of R&D investment
in the constrained component(s) and rs the annual
flow of R&D investment in the slack compo-
nent(s).
If returns to R&D in constraint (slack) compo-
nents are greater (equal to or less) than zero, then a
firm facing a choice of investing R&D in constraint
or slack component is, ceteris paribus, likely to
have a greater incentive to invest in R&D in the





Hypothesis 1 states that, across a complex prod-
uct system, the returns from R&D directed at the
constraint component will outstrip the returns from
R&D to the slack components. Thus, an empirical
test of this hypothesis will involve the demonstra-
tion of a shift in R&D effort devoted to constrained
component(s) relative to the slack component(s).
In summary, the discussion above suggests that if
we assume system performance to be a function of
components’ performance and, in particular, that it
may be a min function of the performance of the
various components, then: (1) component innova-
tion is necessary when one or more component
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technologies are a constraint1 to product perfor-
mance; and (2) marginal returns to R&D directed
at removing constraints is significantly positive,
whereas marginal returns to R&D in slack com-
ponents is zero or negative.
Component interactions
I argued above that the performance of complex
product systems is a min function of components’
performance and that one route to performance
improvement is innovations directed at compo-
nent constraints. Innovations that lift component
constraints, in addition to helping improve sys-
tem performance, tend to alter the interaction rela-
tionships between components in the product sys-
tem (Rosenberg, 1969). This, in turn, alters the
marginal performance contribution of the compo-
nents. Thus, resolution of one or more component
constraints in one period can result in the emer-
gence of one or more other components as con-
straints in the following period.
The point may be illustrated with an example.
Assume that returns to R&D in PCs are highly cor-
related with computing speed measured as MIPS
(million instructions per second) or MFLOPS (mil-
lion floating point operations per second). There-
fore, the R&D objective of PC component design
is to maximize MIPS or MFLOPS. Realized MIPS
or MFLOPS will depend on: (1) the processing
power of the microprocessor; (2) the amount of
memory in the system; (3) the width of the pipeline
(bus) between the microprocessor and the mem-
ory; (4) the speed of physical disk drive; and
(5) the size of the data on which the computation
is to be performed. If the width of the pipeline
bus becomes a constraint to system performance,
no improvement in memory or processing power
of the microprocessor will make any difference
to system performance. An optimal performance
given the constraints is reached when no further
improvements are possible without changing one
or more of the constraint components’ parameters.
Once the constraint in the pipeline bus is lifted,
some of the slack in one or more other components
is absorbed and system performance improves. At
the same time, one or more other components
1 It is also possible that the interface, not the component(s), is
the constraint. In such cases, architectural, rather than compo-
nent, innovation is necessitated. This paper does not deal with
architectural innovation.
become constraints to system performance, thus
increasing the marginal returns to innovation in
those components. The key observation of this
paper is that the period-to-period observed com-
ponent constraints guide the R&D agenda of firms
by altering marginal returns to R&D effort in each
component.
The stylized dynamics of innovation in complex
product systems suggests that following innovation
in a component that is constraining system perfor-
mance we can expect to observe: (1) increase in
system performance; (2) changes in the marginal
performance contribution of different components;
and (3) different component(s) emerging as a con-
straint to system performance.
Firm level
At the firm level, the issue of who invests in resolv-
ing component constraints pertains to the issue of
firm-level R&D scope or technological competen-
cies and its performance implications (Griliches,
1984; Nelson, 1959, 1961; Pavitt, Robson, and
Townsend, 1989). Investigating this empirically,
Patel and Pavitt (1997: 144–145) found that large
firms typically invest in a much broader range
of technical fields than the core product fields in
which they compete. For instance, only 71 per-
cent of chemical firms’ R&D is in chemical tech-
nologies. The remaining R&D spans nonelectri-
cal machinery and electrical/electronics technolo-
gies. Similarly, only about 77 percent of com-
puter industry R&D is concentrated in the elec-
trical/electronic industries. They offer two rea-
sons for such technological diversity (Patel and
Pavitt, 1997). First, the technological interdepen-
dence between manufacturers of products and the
components manufactured by suppliers requires
complex coordination on product improvements,
thus creating the imperative to cross technological
boundaries. Second, exploiting emerging opportu-
nities often requires firms to straddle new techno-
logical domains, again contributing to an increase
in the size of firms’ R&D portfolios (Patel and
Pavitt, 1997: 148). In other words, the primary
impetus for technological diversity lies along the
vertical value chain.
In more recent work, Pavitt and his colleagues
(Brusoni et al., 2001), focusing on systems inte-
grators, return to the question of why firms know
more than they make. Using data from the aircraft
engine control industry, they suggest that firms
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need to know more than they make to cope with
the imbalances caused by uneven rates of devel-
opment in the technologies embedded in products
(Rosenberg, 1969) and unpredictable product inter-
dependencies (Ulrich and Eppinger, 1999). Their
work, while enriching our understanding of R&D
scope choices made by systems integrators such
as Boeing, Airbus, or Dell, provide little guidance
on whether (and how) similar mechanisms might
explain the R&D behavior of component firms as
well.
A complex product system (say PCs) usually
includes several firms with heterogeneously dis-
tributed capabilities and operating in one or more
distinct component industries. Each firm faces an
R&D budget constraint and the problem is one
of allocating the budget to maximize returns from
R&D. However, since firms are likely to special-
ize in one (or few) component(s), the incentives
to invest in resolving component constraints are
unlikely to be uniform across firms. In examining
firm incentives to invest in removing component
constraints, it is useful to distinguish between two
sets of firms: (1) C-firms (Fc), firms that compete
in the product market of a component that is a con-
straint in the current period; and, (2) S-firms (Fs),
firms that compete in the product market of slack
components. As I argue below, even the S-firms
have a strong incentive to resolve constraints.
S-firms
The S-firms are firms that design and/or man-
ufacture slack or nonconstraint components. It
would appear that the S-firms have little incen-
tive to allocate R&D resources to resolve com-
ponent constraints since they would be unable
to directly appropriate any returns from R&D
allocated to resolving the constraints. However,
the unique characteristic of complex product sys-
tems—interdependencies between components—
creates a strong incentive for even the S-firms
to allocate R&D resources to resolving compo-
nent constraints. The existence of component con-
straints not only reduces the incentive for slack
firms to invest annual R&D flows in slack com-
ponents, but also reduces the ability of the S-firms
to appropriate returns from sunk R&D investments
in slack components. The residual value of slack
component R&D stock can be freed only by resolv-
ing the component constraint. Thus, I argue that S-
firms have a strong incentive to direct their annual
R&D flows to resolve component constraints even
if they are not producing the constraint compo-
nent(s).
We know that not all firms have the same incen-
tive to invest in lifting constraints. The incentive to
invest is conditioned largely by the appropriability
regime that firms operate in (Arrow, 1962). If firms
believe that they can capture a significant propor-
tion of the returns from R&D, then they are likely
to invest. However, if the benefits of R&D are
like a public good, i.e., the inventing firm cannot
exclude other firms (e.g., due to poor intellectual
property protection) from exploiting its R&D, then
there is likely to be underinvestment. In such cases,
there is likely to be a free rider problem with firms
waiting for others to resolve the constraint. In other
words, the cost of investing first outstrips expected
economic returns, causing firms to wait and watch
so that they can free ride on other firms’ invest-
ments to lift the constraints.
The free rider problem disappears, however,
when there is a significant cost associated with
waiting. For instance, if the economic returns to
R&D are concentrated in a short time window,
then the firm that moves first will capture a large
portion of the rents before the imitating firms can
catch up and erode the advantage of the innova-
tor. There is a strong incentive here for firms to
not only invest quickly, but also be the first to
come up with an innovation that lifts the con-
straint. This provides the innovating firm with the
short window to skim the economic rents before
imitators compete away the value. In this case,
one imitating firm has few advantages over other
imitators and free riding has little strategic value.
The ‘racing to invest’ behavior is often observed
in high-technology industries such as computers,
telecommunications, and video games (Dasgupta,
1988; Khanna, 1995). The distinguishing feature
of such regimes is a short product life cycle where
the innovator has a small time window to reap
the value of an invention. For instance, in disk
drives, where product life cycles range between 1
and 2 years (Christensen, 1997), if firms miss one
generation their subsequent survival chances are
greatly reduced. Similarly, in the computer indus-
try ‘Moore’s law2 has been a technological beacon
to firms in the field’ (Patel and Pavitt, 1997: 154).
2 Moore’s law refers to the now famous miniaturization hypothe-
sis of Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel Corp., that the
number of transistors on a chip would double every 18 months.
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Thus, I expect that firms will have a strong incen-
tive to invest in resolving the constraint (rather
than wait and watch) when the returns to R&D are
concentrated in a short time window.
There is ample anecdotal evidence in contem-
porary R&D activity that supports this argument.
For instance, Intel developed the PCI bus back in
1992 as a response to the constraint of the ISA
bus introduced in 1984. Even though Intel was not
competing in the bus architecture market, it devel-
oped the architecture and licensed it to the industry
without royalties. The following quote drawn from
Intel’s web site captures the spirit of how con-
straints affect R&D effort and the motivation for it:
PCI was originally developed through the efforts
of Intel and other industry leaders in response to
the realization that ISA, a bus design developed
in 1984, was becoming a bottleneck within the
computer. Intel spurred the industry by forming a
PCI special interest group with others in the indus-
try, contributing technology from Intel research and
development. The result was PCI—one of the most
successful chip and board interconnect technolo-
gies in history. (Intel Corp., 2006)
The PCI architecture that Intel introduced was
followed up with the PCI Express architecture in
2004 that Intel again spearheaded and sponsored.
Similarly, Intel introduced the USB architecture
for interconnection of peripherals for the PC. Intel
does not compete in the peripherals market and
will not be able to directly appropriate the returns
from the USB technology investment. However,
why Intel chooses to do so is seen from the
following quote from Bala Cadambi, the Manager
for the PCI Express initiative:
Intel is in the business of providing the engine
for the PC, just like Honda is in the business
of providing the engine for the automobile. That
[PC] engine is doubling in capacity every 18 to
24 months—that’s Moore’s law. What we really
want is to ensure the rest of the platform goes with
it. This means that if the engine gets better, the
tires get better, the chassis gets better, the roads
get better, and you get better gas mileage . . . we
want the platform, which is everything around the
microprocessor, to be keeping pace and improving
and scaling, so the microprocessor can deliver its
potential. (Cadambi, 2006)
Similarly, AMD, a chip manufacturer, is investing
in R&D in security technologies. AMD’s invest-
ment in security technologies appears spurred by
possible bottlenecks in security technologies that
may be constraining the adoption and growth of
computers, though it does not produce security
software or compete in the security software indus-
try. AMD has an incentive to invest in security
technologies to the extent that PC security con-
cerns dampen the sales of AMD chips. The fol-
lowing quote from AMD captures the importance
of security and how it guides their R&D effort:
AMD is working closely with its chipset ecosys-
tem and key operating system partners to bring
a united security solution to market. This solu-
tion will coordinate next-generation AMD proces-
sor features for secure virtualization, new chipset
features for secure input and output, and new plat-
form components mapping to trusted computing
requirements, such as the TPM. (AMD, 2006)
AMD also invested in a graphics interface standard
to resolve graphics bottlenecks in the PC. The
following quote from an AMD white paper clearly
illustrates how bottlenecks guide and shape R&D
investments:
Tremendous efforts have been made to improve
computing system performance through increases
in CPU processing power; however, I/O bottle-
necks throughout the computing platform can limit
the system performance. To eliminate system bot-
tlenecks, AMD has been working with indus-
try leaders to implement innovative technologies
including AGP, DDR SDRAM, USB2.0, and
HyperTransport technology . . . The Accelerated
Graphics Port (AGP) was developed as a high-
performance graphics interface. It alleviates the
PCI graphics bottleneck by providing high band-
width throughput and direct access to system mem-
ory. (Chen, Johnson, and Suhrstedt, 2002)
Finally, Seagate Technologies, a disk drive man-
ufacturer, invested in the serial ATA standard in
response to the constraint in data communication
between the system board and the disk drive. In all
of the examples cited, the companies did not seek
to directly appropriate the R&D investments in
resolving the component constraints. They licensed
these technologies to the industry under royalty-
free terms so as to promote their diffusion and
thus lift the constraints.
Fixing these ideas more formally, consider two
single-product firms; Fs, which produces a slack
component product, and Fc, which produces a con-
straint component. Each firm has stocks of R&D in
the slack component, Rs, and the constraint com-
ponent, Rc. Therefore, by Equations 1, 2, and 3
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the returns from cumulative R&D in the constraint
component(s), Rc, is positive and, conversely, the
returns from cumulative R&D in the slack compo-







In other words, the slack component firms face
depressed incentives to add annual R&D flows,
rs, to the slack component. In order to extract
value from their accumulated stock of slack R&D,
Rs, the constraint has to be lifted. Thus, slack
component firms have an incentive to invest annual
R&D flows in resolving component constraints
that will release opportunities to extract the value
of accumulated R&D stocks, Rs. In the examples
above, Seagate had to invest in improving data
interface technology, a constraint component, so
that the disk drive investments could be recouped.
Thus, for slack firms, the returns to investing R&D






where the superscript Fs denotes the slack compo-
nent firms.
Finally, there is the question of whether all
slack component firms have the same incentive to
invest in resolving the constraint. From Dierickx
and Cool (1989) we know that asset stocks are an
important source of firm competitive advantage.
It follows, therefore, that firms with the greatest
sunk investments in slack component R&D are
likely to face the greatest incentive to invest in
resolving the constraint. This is because for every
marginal dollar of R&D flows invested in the con-
straint component a firm with large slack com-
ponent R&D stock will receive a multiple of the
R&D flow investment. The lifting of the constraint
will help release the latent value of the accumu-
lated sunk investments in slack component R&D.
Furthermore, cumulativeness of R&D investment
(such as in the semiconductor industry) provides a
strong incentive for slack incumbent firms to invest
in lifting constraints since there is a strong incum-
bency advantage associated with such industries
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984). Thus,
I expect that the slack component firms’ incen-
tive to invest annual R&D flows in the constraint
component is an increasing function of the R&D








The following section briefly describes the empir-
ical study setting—the PC product system—and




The personal computer is a computer designed for
use by a single person. The IBM PC, from its first
release, used a modular design, by which differ-
ent functions were performed by distinct compo-
nents. The components were designed and man-
ufactured by different firms. The design coordi-
nation of the components was achieved by stan-
dardizing the specifications of the PC architecture.
The performance of the PC, however, depends
significantly on the way the components function-
ally interact. A PC comprises several components
and its configuration varies depending on the pur-
pose for which it is used. Also, the configuration
of the PC has tended to vary over time, with
some components disappearing altogether (e.g.,
floppy disk) and new ones emerging (e.g., opti-
cal drives) over the 1981–98 time period. For
these reasons, I chose five PC hardware com-
ponent industries—system board, microprocessor,
memory, display adapter, and hard disk drive—to
include in this study. These five components are
central to the PC and have existed since its cre-
ation in 1981. This provides a consistent baseline
to examine allocation of R&D effort in one or more
of the five components.
• System board. The system board is the heart
of the PC on which the key components are
embedded. It houses the microprocessor and
physical memory, and interfaces with all other
components (e.g., hard drives, monitor, input
devices). Between PC product generations, the
system board has mostly evolved in response to
the technical needs of other components. Within
a product generation, the goal of production cost
reduction has guided its evolution.
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• Microprocessor. The microprocessor is a logic
device that performs the processing function in
the PC. The logical structure of the microproces-
sor comprises three parts: the input/output unit
(I/O), the control unit, and the arithmetic/logic
unit (ALU). The I/O unit links the micropro-
cessor to the rest of the computer. The control
unit is a logic circuit that acts as the interface
between the I/O unit and the ALU. The ALU
interprets the instructions passed by the con-
trol unit and executes them. The results are then
passed out of the microprocessor through the I/O
unit.
• Memory. The primary function of memory
(RAM) is to interface between the user and the
microprocessor. It stores data and instructions
(inputs) and passes them on to the microproces-
sor, and also stores the output to pass back to
the user.
• Display adapter. The display adapter acts as the
interface between the PC and the monitor. Its
primary function is to organize the data in the
computer to present it visually on the monitor.
• Hard disk drives. Hard disk drives are the long-
term memory of the computer. They store data,
information, and software in a form accessible
by the PC. Hard disk drives have evolved on
a trajectory of decreasing physical size, larger
capacity, and faster speeds (see Christensen,
1997, for a detailed description of hard disk
drive technology changes).
A significant limitation of the study is the nonin-
clusion of the PC operating system and important
application software. Clearly, software is a critical
component of the PC system and its inclusion is
warranted. Unfortunately, I was unable to include
software component firms in the study because I
use patents to decompose the R&D effort of firms
into their respective component domains. In the
software industry, historically, copyrights rather
than patents have been the source of intellectual
property protection. This precluded the decompo-
sition of software firms’ R&D budgets into com-
ponent technology domains. While this is clearly
a limitation of the present study, it is common to
other studies as well (see Patel and Pavitt, 1997:
143). Nevertheless, the important caveat is that
the transition from constraint to slack components
could still be triggered by software changes that
are exogenous to the model.
The PC product system comprises subsystems of
the above component products. Each component
is subject to its distinct market selection criteria
in addition to the selection environment of the
PC product system as a whole. Also Moore’s law
has largely guided the product life cycle of PCs,
with just 2–3 years separating product generations
(Langlois and Steinmueller, 1999). This suggests
that firm R&D investment is unlikely to be driven
by free-riding behavior. In addition, R&D invest-
ments in the computer industry have tended to
be cumulative rather than discrete (Malerba et al.,
1999). This increases the importance of sunk R&D
stocks in driving decisions about annual R&D
flows. Thus the PC product system is an attractive




The sample for the empirical study was drawn
from the Corptech Directory of Technology Com-
panies. The Corptech directory is available each
year starting from 1985. Since the PC industry
began around 1981, drawing the list of compa-
nies from 1985 onwards is only an approximation.
As a result of this sampling procedure, firms that
entered and exited the industry during the period
1981–85 will be omitted from my dataset.3 The
directory is organized along industry and product
lines. I included all firms that design/manufacture
the five components (system board, microproces-
sor, memory, display adapter, and hard disk drives)
described above. I identified a total of 173 firms,
both public and private, from the United States,
Europe, Japan, and Taiwan that belonged to the
five component industries. A fortunate coincidence
is that almost all the firms in the dataset (with
the exception of nine firms) generate at least 80
percent of their sales revenues from a single com-
ponent product market.4 Employing the prevail-
ing definitions of firm diversification, nearly all
3 While left censoring is a clear limitation, it is not very signifi-
cant in the present study. In ecological studies of entry and exit,
left censoring can produce biased estimates of relationships. In
the study reported here, the left censoring problem raises some
concerns about generalizability (i.e., representativeness of the
sample) of the results without affecting the estimation itself.
4 I ultimately exclude both IBM and Texas Instruments from
the analysis as they participate significantly in many different
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firms in our sample would be classified as single-
business firms (Rumelt, 1986). Thus, I was able to
establish a one-to-one mapping between firms and
their component product markets.
The bibliographic information for all the patents
granted to the companies in the sample in the
period 1979–98 was obtained from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The
PC industry began in 1981 with the launch of
the first IBM PC.5 I extracted data from 1979
to estimate 2-year lag models. The data include
patent number, title, assignee name, application
date, issue date, and original and current patent
classes. There is a problem of identifying all the
patents granted to a company for a variety of rea-
sons: (1) companies may have been acquired in the
20-year period; (2) companies may have changed
names; (3) companies may have filed patents under
different names (e.g., AMD and Advanced Micro
Devices); and (4) typographical errors made by the
USPTO. Such problems are predominant for large
firms with several business units filing several hun-
dred patents each year. For this subset of firms,
I acquired cleaned data from CHI Research and
cross-checked with the Assignee code field that
the Office of Technology and Forecasting (OTAF)
at the USPTO employs for uniquely identifying
patent assignees.
The second task is one of identifying the con-
straint component(s) in the PC industry during the
study period. For this purpose, I examined and ana-
lyzed product reviews in PC Magazine and PC
World to identify the key component constraints
to system performance. The magazine reviews are
available from 1983 onward. Each magazine pub-
lishes two issues a month for a total of 24 issues
a year. On average, I found about 8–12 detailed
component reviews each year that I employed
to code the binding component constraint. For
instance, consider the following excerpt from a
review:
Over the last few months the glittering image of the
PC AT has acquired a certain patina—some would
say tarnish—because of problems with the data
storage hardware. The core of the problem seems
to be in the 20-megabyte hard disk . . . Because
component markets. However, the results do not change even if
they are included.
5 The study is confined to the IBM PC and does not include
Apple computers. The value chains for the two are largely
distinct and there are few firms that operate in both value chains,
making comparisons less justifiable.
of their delicate architecture, Winchester-type hard
drives have certain inherent limitations. A number
of factors, including power failure, shock, and even
simple vibration, can produce a head crash that
results in partial or total loss of all stored data.
More often a crash will occur when the drive
head makes contact with a dust particle or some
other contaminant on the disk surface. Even if
the hardware is not damaged, it’s still going to
put an end to 10 megabytes or more of files. (PC
Magazine, June 25, 1985: 126)
The above excerpt conveys at least two pieces
of information that allows the identification of
a constraint. One, the first line of the excerpt
suggests that the performance of the system as a
whole (the PC in this case) is affected by the said
component. This implies that system performance
can be improved by solving the problem with the
component. Two, the review also identifies the
precise nature of the constraint (i.e., head crash in
the hard disk). This provides R&D engineers with
a clear problem and thus defines an R&D agenda.
These two pieces of information taken together
help infer that the hard disk might have been a
constraint to effective PC performance in 1985.
For each year I used three to four reviews to
triangulate and identify the primary bottleneck(s).
This was done to ensure that the bottleneck iden-
tified was more likely to be an industry-wide phe-
nomenon rather than peculiar to a company’s prod-
uct or model. In addition, I cross-checked compo-
nent constraints using reviews from PC World to
remove magazine-specific variance, if any. Finally,
I submitted the set of reviews to three graduate
students in Computer Science at the University
of Pennsylvania to identify whether they reflect
constraints to system performance. The set of com-
ponents identified as constraints in a year reflect
unanimity among the three coders. This was done
to remove coder bias, if any. Finally, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, I made the conserva-
tive assumption that a bottleneck is resolved within
one year. In most cases the assumption was rea-
sonable since new models came up within a year
or two following its identification as a constraint.
Table 1 lists the years in which a component was
identified as a constraint.
The coding approach adopted here is subject to
at least one important criticism. The data for cod-
ing constraint components came primarily from
product reviews published in two PC magazines.
It can be argued that the reviews are mostly writ-
ten for an audience of PC users or consumers
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Table 1. Component constraints identified in each year


















rather than for R&D personnel. This raises con-
cerns about a possible confound in establishing
the connection between the reviews and subse-
quent R&D behavior of firms. While it is true
that the reviews are written for consumers, the
reviewers themselves are technically competent
(e.g., Peter Norton, the creator of Norton Utilities,
later acquired by Symantec Corp.) to make accu-
rate and informed evaluations of the components.
Moreover, in most cases, the reviews are based
on evaluation products that firms themselves make
available to the reviewers. Therefore, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that firms might track these
reviews and act on them as well.
The study then sought to identify patents related
to each of the components, since it is my basic
premise that firms operating in complex product
systems allocate inventive effort not only in their
component products but also in the broader prod-
uct system. Unfortunately, there is no simple way
of classifying patents to product markets since the
U.S. patent classification system groups patents by
function rather than application. I conducted the
assignment process in three stages. First, using
patent class descriptions I identified a subset of
patent classes clearly associated with the PC indus-
try. This provided a first-pass mapping of patent
classes to PC component industries that was gen-
erally consistent with a concordance map pro-
duced by the USPTO in the late 1970s. Second,
I excluded from the dataset any patent subclasses
that did not fall within one of the five specified
components (e.g., optical drives). Third, I con-
firmed the classification with industry experts and
employees at the Office of Technology and Fore-
casting and added patent classes that I missed and
expanded the classification from three-digit patent
classes to six digits in cases where the three-digit
classes were too coarse.
Dependent variable: Allocation of inventive
effort
I employed patent count data to construct a mea-
sure of allocation of inventive effort. First, I
obtained patent counts based on patent applica-
tion dates for each firm year across all the patent
classes that constitute the five components. I then
computed the ratio of patents in a particular com-
ponent to the total patents across all components
for each firm year, to capture the relative alloca-





where Yitj is the allocation of inventive effort by
firm i, in year t , in component class j ; PCitj is the
count of patents filed (application date) by firm
i, in year t , in component j ; the denominator is
the aggregate of patents filed by firm i, in year t ,
summed over N(= 5) components.
There is considerable debate in the literature
over the use of patent-based measures in studies of
innovation. It is recognized that firms and indus-
tries widely differ in their propensities to patent
and also in the motives for patenting (Cohen, Nel-
son, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). How-
ever, the components of the PC system are all
subsets of the broader semiconductor industry, and
there is a long tradition of research in this area
using patent data (see, for example, Almeida and
Kogut, 1999, and the studies they cite). There is
general consensus that, though imperfect, patents
may reliably capture inventive activity in the com-
puter industry (Cohen et al., 2000). Besides, there
has been significant criticism only in the use of
patents as a measure of innovation (Trajtenberg,
1990), but the general consensus is that patents are
a fairly reliable indicator of input-side inventive
effort (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). For
instance, Trajtenberg (1990) in a study of the CT
Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 28: 563–584 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
574 S. K. Ethiraj
scanner industry found that the correlation between
patent counts and R&D ranged between 0.79 and
0.91, whereas patent counts had no statistically sig-
nificant relationship with independent measures of
innovation. This led him to conclude that ‘patent
counts are good indicators of the inputs to the
innovative process’ (Trajtenberg, 1990: 179). Con-
sistent with this, the present study uses patents
to decompose the research budgets and capture
their relative allocation to different components.
The primary assumption here is that firms allo-
cate a chunk of research to a product system and
then partition this budget among the components.
Patenting in the component classes allows us to
proxy the relative allocation of firm R&D effort.
Explanatory variables
Constraint component
The constraint component in each year that was
identified from the product reviews was coded as
a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the com-
ponent with a 1-year lag. For example, I found
that the microprocessor was listed as a constraint
to PC performance in 1983. Taking a 1-year lag,
I expect it to influence the relative allocation of
inventive effort in the following year, i.e., 1984.
The 1-year lag was motivated by two consider-
ations. First, there is anecdotal evidence that the
industry has tended to track Moore’s law; i.e.,
technological trajectories follow 18-month cycles.
Second, my interviews with R&D engineers in the
industry indicated that R&D budget cycles usually
lasted 12–14 months. Thus, the results reported
here used a 1-year lag. The results were also robust
to the use of 2-year lags.
S-firms × constraint component interaction
In addition to examining whether inventive effort
in complex product systems responds to compo-
nent constraints, the study sought to make the case
that the slack component firms in the product sys-
tem have a strong incentive to invest in resolving
such constraints. I identified the primary compo-
nent product market domain of each firm in the
sample and created a variable coded 1 if the firm
did not produce the component that was identified
as a constraint in the given year and 0 otherwise.
I interacted this variable with the constraint com-
ponent dummy to test Hypothesis 2.
S-firms × constraint component × firm slack
knowledge stock interaction
Hypothesis 3 argued that the slack component
firms’ incentive to invest in resolving the constraint
is increasing in their sunk R&D investments in the
slack component. I created a stock of firm knowl-
edge in the slack component by cumulating the
firm stock of patents in the primary slack compo-
nent and interacted it with the S-firms dummy and
the constraint component dummy.
Control variables
Component industry R&D intensity
Several studies document the robust relationship
between R&D expenses and patenting (Hausman
et al., 1984; Trajtenberg, 1990). In order to account
for component industry differences in R&D inten-
sity, I measure R&D intensity as a contemporane-
ous time-varying estimate of the ratio of aggregate
R&D expenses in each component to its aggre-
gate sales. The component-level R&D expenses
and sales were obtained by aggregating the R&D
expenses and sales, respectively, of all public firms
listed in Standard & Poor’s Compustat in the cor-
responding four-digit SIC class. It is likely that
aggregating the R&D expenses and sales of only
public firms understates the actual expenses and
sales in the components. However, this is not a
significant concern, if the understatement does not
vary systematically by component technology. For
instance, if mostly private firms populate the sys-
tem board component industry, then the extent of
understatement will be higher. I employ other con-
trols to account for this.
Component industry sales
Schmookler’s (1966) central argument is that
demand conditions are the basic drivers of allo-
cation of inventive effort. I attempt to account for
demand conditions using past sales information. I
measure sales as a time-varying estimate of aggre-
gate sales in each component industry lagged by
1 year.
Component industry size
Schumpeter (1950) argued that large firms with
R&D programs would account for a disproportion-
ate number of innovations in the economy. The
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R&D–size relationship is explained by a variety
of reasons: capital market imperfections that allow
large firms to invest greater amounts in R&D; scale
economies in research; and better capabilities of
large firms to appropriate returns from research.
Size is measured as the time-varying estimate of
the log of total number of employees in each com-
ponent industry measured at the four-digit SIC
class.
Component industry knowledge base
Prior research indicates that in cumulative tech-
nologies the ability to absorb and create new
knowledge is conditioned by past knowledge or
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Therefore, patenting propensity in a cumulative
technology such as semiconductors is likely to be
higher to the extent that there are already a large
number of prior patents to build upon. Knowledge
base is measured as a time-varying estimate of the
cumulative patents (by application date) filed by
all firms in the component lagged by 1 year.
Component industry concentration
There is some evidence in the literature that R&D
incentives are conditioned by market structure.
While Schumpeter (1950) argued that large firms
in concentrated industries have a greater incen-
tive for innovation, Arrow (1962) showed that
a monopolist has less incentive to innovate than
firms in competitive industries. I control for such
differences in the five component industries using
a time-varying Herfindahl measure of the extent of
concentration in each component industry.
Other component industry controls
Patenting propensities and R&D budgets vary
systematically by industry. In order to capture
such differences, I created four time-invariant
dummy variables coded as 1 if the firm belonged
to each of the following component industries:
(1) microprocessor; (2) memory; (3) display
adapter; and (4) system board. The omitted cat-
egory was hard disk drive component firms.
Firm age
Empirical evidence indicates that organizational
age and experience in a particular industry are
positively related to patenting (Sorenson and Stu-
art, 2000). As organizations develop experience
with patenting, they develop and refine the routines
for search and discovery of incremental inventions
that improve their productivity over time. Though
the dependent variable here is not patenting, we
can expect inventive effort in component tech-
nologies to be somewhat related to firm age. As
firms age, their routines are likely to get entrenched
over time. Such routines may also create inertia in
inventive effort and increase consistency with the
past (Nelson and Winter, 1982). I measured firm
age as the time-invariant estimate of the founding
year.
Firm knowledge stock
The cost of patenting is likely to vary signifi-
cantly across firms. Firms that have patented in
the past are likely to face lower costs of patenting
in the future as a function of knowledge infras-
tructure, spillovers from R&D projects, knowledge
of the patenting process, and so on. Therefore, I
expect past experience in a component technology
to increase the patenting propensity of firms. In
addition, it is important to control for the main
effect of firm knowledge stocks since Hypothe-
sis 3 is based on an interaction effect with firm
slack knowledge stock. I control for firm slack
knowledge base as a time-varying stock of patents
(aggregated by application date) held by each firm
in each component technology lagged by 1 year.
Firm ownership status
Prior research leads us to expect research effort to
vary systematically by ownership status of firms.
We expect private firms (as compared with pub-
lic firms) to be smaller and have smaller R&D
budgets that will limit their ability to patent their
inventions. Also firms filing fewer patents will
be unable to exploit economies of scale in patent
attorney fees and other administrative overheads.
Similarly, foreign firms are likely to have different
propensities to patent. Only the larger and more
multinational of foreign firms are likely to patent
in the United States. Consequently, we measure
ownership status as two time-invariant variables:
private, taking a value of 1 if the patenting firm is
private; and public, taking a value of 1 if the firm
is publicly traded in U.S. capital markets. Foreign
firms are the omitted category.
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Time
Prior research suggests that patenting propensities
have varied over time (Kortum, 1993). This may be
due to an altered regulatory environment, changing
appropriability conditions, and so on. I control for
patent application year using time dummies or time
trend.
Analysis
The dependent variable employed in this study
is a proportion, and if the inventive effort allo-
cated to all five components is included in the
analysis the total inventive effort for a firm year
will sum to one. This property of the dependent
variable creates two estimation challenges. First,
when the dependent variable is a proportion, esti-
mation using ordinary least squares (OLS) results
in the predicted values falling outside the range
of the dependent variable. This poses problems
in estimating elasticities of the coefficients. This
problem, however, is relatively easily fixed. One
solution is to logit-transform the proportions and
estimate the model via OLS. A second solution is
to estimate a two-limit tobit specifying censoring
of the dependent variable at 0 and 1, respectively.
I implement the former as the primary analyses in
the paper and report the latter in the robustness
section.
The second problem, i.e., the dependent vari-
able in a firm-year summing to one, causes the
errors within panels to be correlated. This problem,
which is harder to fix, is commonly encountered
in political science in studies predicting relative
vote shares in multiparty elections. Recently, Katz
and King (1999) developed what they claimed
to be the first solution to this estimation chal-
lenge. Their approach to deal with the noninde-
pendence of proportions (i.e., increase in the pro-
portion of inventive effort allocated to one com-
ponent comes at the expense of effort allocated
to one or more other components) involves trans-
forming the dependent variable into log odds-ratios
and maximizing a likelihood function over a multi-
variate t-distribution. This approach cannot easily
be adapted in this study simply because, as the
authors themselves note, it does not scale up easily
to models with greater than three groups without
resorting to numerical approximations (Katz and
King, 1999: 25, 30). I sought to deal with this dif-
ficulty in two ways. First, I included data for the
R&D effort in only four of the five component cat-
egories (system board was the omitted category).
This somewhat mitigates the problem since the
proportions in a firm year will not sum to zero.
From the standpoint of the study, it was also con-
venient since the system board was never identified
as a constraint during the 1981–98 time period.
Second, I estimated the equation using generalized
least squares (GLS) allowing for errors to be cor-
related within panels (Davidson and MacKinnon,
1993). While this does not solve all the problems,
it appears to be the most feasible solution given
the current state of the art. Thus, the basic model






= αt + γj + Cj(t−1) + FSi × Cj(t−1)
+ β1FSi × Cj(t−1) × KSi(t−1)
+ β2nX′i(t−1) + β3nX′′j (t−1) + εitj
where Yitj is the allocation of inventive effort by
firm i, in year t , in component class j ; αt are the
year dummies; γj are the component dummies;
C captures the constraint; FS is the slack firm
dummy, KS is the knowledge stock in the slack
components, X′i(t−1) is the vector of firm-specific
covariates lagged 1 year; and, X′′j (t−1) is the vector
of component-specific covariates lagged 1 year. In
all models I report robust standard errors, adjusted
for multiple observations per firm year.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and cor-
relations for the variables in the analyses. The
dependent variable, inventive effort, is the logit-
transform of the proportion of patents in each
component product, which is why it has a nega-
tive mean. Similarly, all the proportion variables
that are logged have negative values. Examin-
ing the correlation matrix suggests that all the
correlations are in the expected direction. Num-
ber of employees, knowledge base, and sales are
highly correlated (γ > 0.65). This creates some
prima facie concern about possible multicollinear-
ity in estimation. Note, however, that the correla-
tion matrix does not correct for serial correlation
among the variables, leading to somewhat inflated
coefficients. The estimation procedures employed
in the regression models attempt to control for
serial correlation.
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Table 3. Logit-transformed OLS regression estimates
Model 1 2 3 4
Inventive effort Inventive effort Inventive effort Inventive effort
Constraint 0.339∗ −0.450∗ −0.460∗∗
(0.143) (0.174) (0.175)
Constraint × Slack 2.009∗∗ 2.133∗∗
(0.290) (0.298)
Constraint × Slack × Firm knowledge stock 0.106∗
(0.052)
ln(Firm knowledge stock) 0.635∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 0.628∗∗ 0.619∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.045)
R&D intensity 0.004 0.013 0.014 0.017
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
ln(Employees) −0.744+ −0.806∗ −0.944∗ −0.973∗
(0.400) (0.403) (0.396) (0.393)
ln(Knowledge stock) 2.002∗∗ 2.080∗∗ 2.167∗∗ 2.185∗∗
(0.341) (0.344) (0.336) (0.336)
ln(Sales) 0.019 0.026 0.091 0.096
(0.227) (0.228) (0.221) (0.218)
Concentration −1.073 −1.073 −0.844 −0.826
(0.818) (0.818) (0.818) (0.806)
Ownership dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Component dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Year dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Constant −10.361∗∗ −10.442∗∗ −10.350∗∗ −10.237∗∗
(2.290) (2.288) (2.229) (2.230)
Observations 4639 4639 4639 4639
F -value 22.52∗∗ 21.80∗∗ 23.33∗∗ 24.63∗∗
R2 0.408 0.409 0.417 0.418
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ Significant at 10%; ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
Table 3 reports the results of a series of regres-
sion models. For ease of exposition, I report and
interpret only the logit-transformed OLS as the
main results. The robustness results with alter-
native specifications are reported and discussed
in the next subsection to provide confidence in
the main results reported in Table 3 (see sup-
plementary analyses provided in the Appendix).
All models are estimated on a sample of inven-
tive effort in four components (system board is
excluded), include year dummies, and report robust
standard errors corrected for multiple observations
per firm-year. Model 1 estimates an OLS model
with only the control variables. The overall model
is highly significant and the sign and significance
of the coefficients on the control variables are all
as expected.6 I expected significant differences in
6 Testing for multicollinearity, I found that the highest VIF
(variance inflation factor) was 2.23 and the mean for all variables
was 1.6, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a serious issue
(Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000).
inventive effort allocation across public, private,
and foreign firms. The expectation was largely
borne out. The coefficients for the ownership dum-
mies were positive and significant. Similarly, the
component industry dummies were also jointly sig-
nificant, suggesting that the allocation of inventive
effort is heterogeneous across component indus-
tries. This is not surprising given that there are
likely to be significant differences in appropri-
ability and R&D incentives across the component
industries.
Model 2 includes the constraint component vari-
able. The coefficient on the constraint compo-
nent dummy is positive and statistically signif-
icant. Since the dependent variable was logit-
transformed, interpreting the coefficient on the
constraint component involves transforming the
coefficient back to its original scale. Generat-
ing the predicted values of the logit-transformed
dependent variable for the two values of the con-
straint component dummy and transformed back
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to the original scale, I found that components that
are constraints to system performance on average
receive about 13 percent higher inventive effort as
compared with slack components. This provides
strong support for Hypothesis 1 that component
constraints act as triggers for R&D investment.
Model 3 adds the slack firm times constraint
component dummy to test Hypothesis 2. Note that
the coefficient on the constraint dummy turns neg-
ative. Interpreting this coefficient by itself is mis-
leading because of the interaction effect. Accurate
interpretation involves computing the joint impact
of the main effect and the interaction effect. Once
again transforming the coefficients on the con-
straint dummy and the interaction dummy sug-
gests that much of the investment in resolving
component constraints comes from the slack com-
ponent firms. On average, the slack component
firms shift about 8.5 percent of their R&D effort
toward resolving component constraints. This pro-
vides strong support for Hypothesis 2.
Finally, Model 4 adds the interaction of the slack
firm dummy, constraint component dummy, and
the firm knowledge stock dummy. The coefficient
on the interaction term is positive and signifi-
cant. Transforming the coefficients to their orig-
inal scales, I find that a 1 percent increase in firm
knowledge stock in slack components increases the
investment of slack firms in the constraint compo-
nent by 0.8 percent. This provides strong support
for Hypothesis 3.
Robustness tests
In light of the specification and estimation con-
cerns outlined in the Analysis section, I ran a
series of alternative models that are presented in
the Appendix. Model A presents the results of an
OLS model with the raw proportions as the depen-
dent variable. Model B presents the results of the
two-limit tobit. The signs and significance of the
coefficients are in accord with the main results pre-
sented in Table 3. All three hypotheses continue to
be supported.
The models discussed thus far were estimated on
a sample that excluded the fifth component (system
board) to somewhat mitigate the problem of con-
temporaneous correlation in the dependent variable
for a firm year. Since this fix does not completely
eliminate the problem, I sought to estimate the
main model in Table 3 using GLS and allowing
for panel-specific heteroskedasticity. Model C in
the Appendix presents these results. The coefficient
estimates for all the variables are generally consis-
tent with the estimates from the previous models.
Transforming the estimates back to the original
scale as in the case of Model 2 suggests that the
component that is a constraint to system perfor-
mance receives 9.6 percent greater inventive effort
than slack components. The results taken together
provide convergent evidence that firm-level inven-
tive effort does indeed respond to component con-
straints in complex product systems.
All of the models reported thus far assume that
the patenting propensity of firms is uniform across
component industries. In other words, when a firm
does not allocate inventive effort to a component
industry in a given year, the dependent variable for
that firm–component–year will be zero. The mod-
els above assume that the process that is driving the
nonallocation of inventive effort (i.e., zero effort)
is no different from the process driving the mag-
nitude of inventive effort (i.e., effort greater than
zero). However, this is unlikely to be the case since
patenting propensities vary systematically both by
firm (Hausman et al., 1984), and industry (Cohen
et al., 2000). In other words, the decision to allo-
cate R&D effort in a given component industry
may be endogenous to the firm and ignoring this
endogeneity can pose an omitted variable problem.
To control for this, I estimated a two-step Heck-
man model. I first estimated, using a binary probit
model, the likelihood that a firm will allocate R&D
effort in a particular component technology. The
dependent variable is coded 1 if it allocates inven-
tive effort in a component industry in a given
year and 0 otherwise. This produced an estimate
of a nonselection hazard for each observation in
the sample. In the second step, I estimated an
OLS model including the nonselection hazard. The
results of this estimation are presented in Models D
and E. Model D presents the selection model that
estimates the likelihood that a firm will allocate
R&D effort in a component technology. As can be
seen, the nonselection hazard (lambda) is statisti-
cally significant, suggesting selection bias in the
data. Model E presents the estimation model after
correcting for the selection bias. The results are
largely consistent with the results reported in the
previous models. This provides some confidence
that the effect of constraint-induced innovation is
present even when I control for endogeneity in the
allocation of R&D effort to a component industry.
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Because I confined this study to only component
innovation and excluded architectural innovation,
the possibility of an important alternative expla-
nation is raised. If architectural change is the pri-
mary impetus for component innovation and the
timing of architectural change coincides with the
timing of the identification of constraints, I would
be wrongly attributing my results to the constraints
explanation, whereas architectural change may be
the true underlying reason. I sought to deal with
this potential omitted variable empirically. The
personal computer architecture is largely defined
by the width of the data bus (Messmer, 1997).
The data bus architecture has changed three times
during the timeframe of this study: 1983 (change
from 8-bit to 16-bit), 1985 (change from 16-bit
to 32-bit), and 1993 (change from 32-bit to 64-
bit). I dropped all identification of constraints in
the years 1983, 1985, and 1993 (see Table 1 for
years in which component constraints were iden-
tified) and reran all the models in Table 3. The
results were unchanged, providing confidence that
coincidental architectural change is unlikely to be
driving the results.
In addition to the models reported in the paper,
I performed a variety of other robustness checks.
The models above do not account for unob-
served, but systematic firm differences in patenting
propensities. Inclusion of the firm-specific effects
in the above models would preclude the inclusion
of the S-firm, component industry, and firm owner-
ship dummies, respectively. For additional robust-
ness, I estimated fixed-effects and random-effects
versions of Model 2. The results were largely sim-
ilar. The component constraint variable continues
to be positive and significant, though the magni-
tude declines marginally to 7.8 percent. Overall the
results seem robust to these alternative model spec-
ifications.
A second concern was the presence of autocor-
relation in the panel data. I plotted the residuals
from Model 4 in Table 3 for year t against year
t − 1. The plot was indicative of a marginally pos-
itive first-order serial correlation in the data. To
examine the significance of serial correlation on
the reported results, I extracted a balanced sam-
ple of firms and re-estimated Model 4 in the paper
allowing for first-order, within-panel autocorrela-
tion. The estimates were largely identical to that of
Model 4, providing further confidence that serial
correlation is unlikely to be driving the results.
Finally, there is some concern that firms with
large R&D budgets such as Intel Corp. may be
driving the results. I reran Model 4 eliminating
such prominent firms and the results were qualita-
tively similar, providing confidence that the results
are not driven by such outliers.
DISCUSSION
The study reported here makes some useful the-
oretical and empirical contributions to the liter-
ature on firm R&D scope. The primary contri-
bution of the paper is in drawing out the rela-
tionship between technological characteristics and
firm incentives to invest in innovation. The paper
argues and empirically demonstrates that interac-
tions between components in a product system
conditions the R&D incentives of firms and also
that the incentives are increasing in their prior
investments or capabilities. The empirical study
provided strong support for all three hypotheses
advanced in the paper. In summary, I would like
to emphasize three principal contributions of this
study.
First, the empirical results confirm the coun-
terintuitive prediction that slack component firms
have a strong incentive to resolve component con-
straints. Furthermore, the incentive of slack com-
ponent firms to invest in the constraint compo-
nent is increasing in their sunk R&D investments
in slack components. This highlights an appar-
ent paradox of modularity. Rather than increase
specialization and reduce the scope of firm R&D
activities, modularity creates an impetus for firms
in a product system, regardless of the compo-
nent product market in which they compete, to
resolve component constraints and thus expand
their R&D scope beyond their component prod-
uct markets. At a more general level, the apparent
paradox highlighted here is hardly surprising. By
definition, what makes large-scale systems com-
plex is the nonlinearities inherent in their behavior
(Cohen and Axelrod, 1999). By this token, it is
not surprising that modularity, as with any orga-
nizing principle in complex systems, comes with
its own trade-offs. On the one hand, modularity
accelerates innovation by promoting specialization
and facilitating autonomous research efforts (Ethi-
raj and Levinthal, 2004b). But on the other hand,
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it increases the interdependence of firm compo-
nent R&D efforts; realizing returns from com-
ponent R&D is often contingent on concomitant
developments in other components that are beyond
the control of individual firms. This, in turn, cre-
ates the impetus for firms to expand R&D efforts
beyond the component product markets in which
they operate. This intuition also extends in impor-
tant ways the research on why firm R&D scope is
often much broader than their product scope (Bru-
soni et al., 2001). This paper broadens the expla-
nation for breadth of R&D scope to all firms in
complex product systems rather than just systems
integrators.
Second, the empirical results suggest that con-
straint component(s) receive about 13 percent
higher inventive effort on average, as compared
with slack components. I also found that a signifi-
cant proportion of inventive effort is stable (about
40%), i.e., not induced by technical imbalances.
This leads to the question of whether constraint-
induced innovation is trivial enough to be ignored
by R&D managers. The coefficient on the con-
straint component is net of the variance in alloca-
tion of inventive effort explained by R&D expen-
diture, scale, age, and so on. It may be explaining
unobservables that constitute inventive effort (e.g.,
managerial attention, management commitment). It
is hard to attach economic value to such factors,
making it hard to quantify the economic impact of
constraint-induced technical change.
However, some qualitative assessment is possi-
ble. The proportion of patents in each component
technology is the proxy for allocation of inven-
tive effort. Therefore, a 10 percent shift (net of
R&D, scale, etc.) in allocation in a particular year
means that the patents applied for in the constraint
component domain increases by 10 percent. For
instance, assume a system with two components,
A and B, with a total of 100 patents. Component A
accounts for 20 patents (B accounts for the remain-
ing 80) in period 1 when it is identified as a con-
straint. In period 2, a shift in allocation means that
component A will witness an eight-patent increase
(10% of 80 patents in component B), signifying
a year-over-year increase from 20 to 28 patents.
Conversely, if component B is a binding con-
straint, it will witness a year-over-year increase
of two patents (10% of 20 patents in component
A). This suggests that components that have a
large accumulated knowledge base are less likely
to be radically affected by the emergence of con-
straints. In contrast, components with a relatively
small knowledge base can witness large technolog-
ical changes that can, in turn, significantly affect
the trajectories of product systems. Under such
circumstances, ignoring constraint-induced inno-
vation can prove detrimental to R&D managers.
In other words, my study suggests that the emer-
gence of constraints in relatively less important
and innocuous components might trigger radical
changes in them that in turn present implications
for the more important components as well.
Lastly, the paper has taken the first step in
directly testing the constraint-induced innovation
hypothesis. The induced innovation hypothesis is
mostly supported by historical accounts of techno-
logical change and innovation (Rosenberg, 1969,
1974). Prior large-sample empirical work in this
area is concentrated in the agriculture sector,
where researchers have tried to examine factor
substitution biases rather than induced innova-
tion. R&D activity in complex product systems
provides an ideal context for testing the induced
innovation hypothesis. I examined the changes
in relative R&D allocation to different compo-
nents in response to the emergence of ‘techni-
cal imbalances’ caused by component constraints.
This enabled the first large-sample empirical test of
Rosenberg’s (1969) assertion that technical imbal-
ances or constraints induce shifts in the allocation
of inventive effort. A test of this idea is important
to the extent that implications of ignoring con-
straints might threaten the survival of incumbent
firms. It appears that the security of specialization
that modularity affords does not extend to R&D
investment choices. It is important for firms to
recognize both the power and limits of modular
architectures in functionally interdependent prod-
uct systems.
Lastly, there is the important question of gen-
eralizability of the arguments and findings in the
paper. In this respect, Pil and Cohen (2006) suggest
that an important distinction in modular systems is
between open and closed architectures. Whereas
open systems have common interface specifica-
tions (such as the PC), closed systems do not
(e.g., automobiles and bicycles). This raises the
question of whether my findings generalize only
to open, modular systems such as PCs. There are
two necessary conditions for my results to hold:
(1) modularity in design of components (as distinct
from modularity in production and modularity in
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use); and (2) competition in the component mar-
kets (i.e., entry and exit). These two conditions
are necessary for the principal mechanisms in my
hypotheses to become salient, i.e., functional inter-
dependencies between components and imbalances
in their rates of technical progress. If these two
conditions are met, I expect my results to carry to
other modular products regardless of whether they
are characterized by open or closed architectures.
In conclusion, the paper has documented inter-
esting patterns of innovation and change in com-
plex product systems. However, the paper exam-
ined only one small piece of the larger puzzle of
the coordination of economic activity in complex
systems. A subject worthy of future research is a
comprehensive examination of the trade-offs posed
by modular design principles. Examining how
modularity affects other important organizational
choices and processes will aid in a fuller under-
standing of the managerial challenges in dealing
effectively with complexity (Ethiraj and Levinthal,
2004a).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Financial support from the Huntsman Center for
Global Competition and Innovation at the Whar-
ton School is gratefully acknowledged. I thank
two anonymous reviewers, Gautam Ahuja, George
Day, Dan Levinthal, Hart Posen, Harbir Singh,
Jitendra Singh, Sidney Winter, and seminar partic-
ipants at the Wharton School, Boston University,
University of Minnesota, University of Southern
California, Harvard Business School, MIT Sloan
School of Management, University of Michigan,
London Business School, Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, and New York University for useful com-
ments. I also thank executives at IBM, Intel, Texas
Instruments, and the staff at CHI Research and the
Office of Technology and Forecasting for help with
mapping patent classes to component industries.
REFERENCES
Almeida P, Kogut B. 1999. Localization of knowledge
and the mobility of engineers in regional networks.
Management Science 45(7): 905–917.
AMD. 2006. AMD 3-year technology outlook. http://
www.amdcompare.com/techoutlook/ [26 September
2006].
Arrow K. 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of
resources for invention. In The Rate and Direction of
Inventive Activity , Nelson R (ed). Princeton University
Press: Princeton, NJ; 609–625.
Baldwin CY, Clark KB. 2000. Design Rules: The Power
of Modularity . MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Brusoni S, Prencipe A, Pavitt K. 2001. Knowledge
specialization, organizational coupling, and the
boundaries of the firm: why do firms know more than
they make? Administrative Science Quarterly 46(4):
597–621.
Cadambi B. 2006. PCI-Express Case study. Intel Corp.
http://developer.intel.com/standards/case/case pci.
htm [8 May 2006].
Chatterjee S, Hadi AS, Price B. 2000. Regression
Analysis by Example (3rd edn). Wiley: New York.
Chen A, Johnson J, Suhrstedt A. 2002. Introduction to
AGP-8X. Advanced Micro Devices: http://www.amd.
com/us-en/assets/content type/white papers and
tech docs/AGP8X 26292A PM revision.pdf [accessed
26 September 2006].
Christensen C. 1997. The Innovator’s Dilemma: When
New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail . Harvard
Business School Press: Boston, MA.
Clark KB, Fujimoto T. 1991. Product Development Per-
formance: Strategy, Organization, and Management in
the World Auto Industry . Harvard Business School
Press: Boston, MA.
Cohen M, Axelrod R. 1999. Harnessing Complexity:
Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier .
Free Press: New York.
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA. 1990. Absorptive capacity:
a new perspective on learning and innovation.
Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1): 128–152.
Cohen WM, Nelson RR, Walsh J. 2000. Protecting their
intellectual assets: appropriability conditions and why
U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not). Working
paper, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Boston, MA.
Dasgupta P. 1988. Patents, priority and imitation or, the
economics of races and waiting games. Economic
Journal 98(389): 66–80.
Davidson R, MacKinnon JG. 1993. Estimation and
Inference in Econometrics . Oxford University Press:
Oxford, U.K.
Dierickx I, Cool K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and
sustainability of competitive advantage. Management
Science 35(12): 1504–1512.
Ethiraj SK, Levinthal DA. 2004a. Bounded rationality
and the search for organizational architecture:
an evolutionary perspective on the design of
organizations and their evolvability. Administrative
Science Quarterly 49(3): 404–437.
Ethiraj SK, Levinthal DA. 2004b. Modularity and
innovation in complex systems. Management Science
50(2): 159–173.
Garud R, Kumaraswamy A. 1993. Changing competitive
dynamics in network industries: an exploration of
Sun Microsystems’ open systems strategy. Strategic
Management Journal 14(5): 351–369.
Garud R, Kumaraswamy A. 1995. Technological and
organizational designs for realizing economies of
substitution. Strategic Management Journal , Summer
Special Issue 16: 93–109.
Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 28: 563–584 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Allocation of Inventive Effort in Complex Product Systems 583
Griliches Z (ed). 1984. R&D, Patents, and Productivity .
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL.
Hausman J, Hall B, Griliches Z. 1984. Econometric
models for count data with an application to
the patents–R&D relationship. Econometrica 52(4):
909–938.
Hoetker G. 2006. Do modular products lead to modular
organizations? Strategic Management Journal 27(6):
501–518.
Intel Corp. 2006. Intel PCI and PCI Express: case study.
http://developer.intel.com/standards/case/case pci.
htm [8 May 2006].
Katz JN, King G. 1999. A statistical model for multiparty
electoral data. American Political Science Review
93(1): 15–32.
Khanna T. 1995. Racing behavior: technological evolu-
tion in the high-end computer industry. Research Pol-
icy 24(6): 933–959.
Kortum S. 1993. Equilibrium R&D and the patent–R&D
ratio: U.S. evidence. American Economic Review
83(2): 450–457.
Langlois R, Steinmueller WE. 1999. The evolution of
competitive advantage in the worldwide Semiconduc-
tor industry, 1947–1996. In The Sources of Industrial
Leadership, DC Mowery RR Nelson (eds). Cambridge
University Press: New York; 19–78.
Levin RC, Klevorick AK, Nelson RR, Winter SG. 1987.
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and
development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
3: 783–820.
Malerba F, Nelson R, Orsenigo L, Winter S. 1999.
History-friendly models of industry evolution: the
computer industry. Industrial and Corporate Change
8(1): 3–40.
Messmer H-P. 1997. The Indispensable PC Hardware
Book . Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA.
Nelson RR. 1959. The economics of invention: a survey
of the literature. Journal of Business 32(2): 101–127.
Nelson RR. 1961. Uncertainty, learning, and the
economics of parallel research and development
efforts. Review of Economics and Statistics 43(4):
351–364.
Nelson RR, Winter SG. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory
of Economic Change. Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, MA.
Patel P, Pavitt K. 1997. The technological competencies
of the world’s largest firms: complex and path-
dependent, but not much variety. Research Policy
26(2): 141–156.
Pavitt K, Robson M, Townsend J. 1989. Technological
accumulation, diversification, and organization in U.K.
companies, 1945–1983. Management Science 35(1):
81–99.
Pil FK, Cohen SK. 2006. Modularity: implications
for imitation, innovation, and sustained advantage.
Academy of Management Review 31(4): 995–1011.
Prencipe A. 1997. Technological capabilities and product
evolutionary dynamics: a case study from the aero
engine industry. Research Policy 25(8): 1261–1276.
Rosenberg N. 1969. The direction of technologi-
cal change: inducement mechanisms and focusing
devices. Economic Development and Cultural Change
18(1): 1–24.
Rosenberg N. 1974. Science, invention, and economic
growth. Economic Journal 84(333): 90–108.
Rumelt RP. 1986. Strategy, Structure, and Economic
Performance (rev. edn). Harvard Business School
Press: Boston, MA.
Sahal D. 1981. Patterns of Technological Innovation .
Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA.
Sanchez R, Mahoney JT. 1996. Modularity, flexibility,
and knowledge management in product and organi-
zation design. Strategic Management Journal , Winter
Special Issue 17: 63–76.
Schilling M. 2000. Toward a general modular systems
theory and its application to interfirm product
modularity. Academy of Management Review 25(2):
312–334.
Schilling M, Steensma KH. 2001. The use of modular
organizational forms: an industry-level analysis.
Academy of Management Journal 44(6): 1149–1168.
Schmookler J. 1966. Invention and Economic Growth .
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
Schumpeter JA. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democ-
racy . Harper: New York.
Shibata T, Yano M, Kodama F. 2005. Empirical analysis
of evolution of product architecture Fanuc numerical
controllers from 1962 to 1997. Research Policy 34(1):
13–31.
Simon HA. 1962. The architecture of complexity.
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
106(6): 467–482.
Sorenson J, Stuart T. 2000. Aging, obsolescence, and
organizational innovation. Administrative Science
Quarterly 45(1): 81–112.
Trajtenberg M. 1990. A penny for your quotes: patent
citations and the value of innovations. RAND Journal
of Economics 21(1): 172–187.
Ulrich KT. 1995. The role of product architecture in the
manufacturing firm. Research Policy 24(3): 419–440.
Ulrich KT, Eppinger SD. 1999. Product Design and
Development (2nd edn). McGraw-Hill: New York.
Winter SG. 1984. Schumpeterian competition in alter-
native technological regimes. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 5(3–4): 287–320.
Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 28: 563–584 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/smj















Constraint −0.041∗∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.144 −0.610∗
(0.014) (0.035) (0.136) (0.241)
Constraint × Slack 0.198∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 1.184∗∗ 2.728∗∗
(0.025) (0.045) (0.191) (0.340)
Constraint × Slack × Firm
knowledge stock
0.010∗ 0.004 0.082∗ 0.169∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.034) (0.068)
ln(Firm knowledge stock) 0.036∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.555∗∗ 0.701∗∗ 0.361∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.036) (0.034)
R&D intensity −0.002 0.003 0.125∗∗ −1.056∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.041) (0.506)
ln(Employees) −0.093∗∗ −0.170∗∗ −0.792∗∗ 0.362
(0.034) (0.051) (0.217) (0.366)
ln(Knowledge stock) 0.228∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 1.802∗∗ 1.656∗∗
(0.029) (0.053) (0.266) (0.375)
ln(Sales) 0.025 0.018 0.265∗∗ −0.030
(0.021) (0.024) (0.097) (0.172)
Concentration −0.075 0.008 −0.080 −0.872+
(0.068) (0.077) (0.407) (0.482)




Ownership dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. N.A.
Component dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. N.A.
Year dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. N.A.
Constant −1.045∗∗ −1.583∗∗ −11.932∗∗ −45.880∗∗ −17.184∗∗
(0.213) (0.287) (1.209) (8.832) (1.606)
Observations 4639 4639 4639 4639 4639
R2 0.337
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ Significant at 10%; ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
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